C) First Civil War - Military Events
Military events of the first English Civil War
- Created by: lucyf
- Created on: 17-04-14 15:54
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- First Civil War - Military Events
- Strengths + Weaknesses
- Parliament
- Controlled more populated + prosperous parts of kingdom
- London - vital source of wealth
- War finances on much sounder footing than Charles'
- Pym set up efficient tax-gathering mechanisms
- Compounding - well-organised system of exploiting estates of Royalist supporters in Parliamentary areas.
- Monthly assessment
- Pym set up efficient tax-gathering mechanisms
- Control of Navy = control of trade
- Able to ensure London continued to be trading capital
- Restricted Charles' ability to trade with continent
- Military supplies + troops from neighbouring monarchs
- Had been unpaid by Charles
- Partly due to popularity of Earl of Warwick (appointed commander by Parliament)
- Controlled more populated + prosperous parts of kingdom
- King
- Had advantages in early months
- Cavalry probably better
- German nephew Prince Rupert = talented cavalry commander
- Cavalry probably better
- Financial problems
- Controlled poorer north and west
- Had to rely partly on individual gifts + gold and silver plate given by Oxford colleges
- Many commanders paid troops themselves
- Although fundraising = well organised in some areas, in general, money became one of the major factors in defeat
- Clarendon: 'the incurable disease of want of money'
- In theory: war effort should have been more co-ordinated (Charles = Commander-in-Chief)
- BUT factions + rivalries undermined the common cause
- Digby tried to turn Charles against his field commanders (esp. Rupert)
- Some Royalist officers (ie. Lord George Goring) = as interested in plundering as in winning battles
- BUT factions + rivalries undermined the common cause
- Had advantages in early months
- Parliament
- Battle of Edgehill (October 1642)
- Charles advances on London
- Army of c.10,000
- Parliamentary commander = Earl of Essex
- Had some military experience
- Gave status to parliamentary cause
- Cautious + uninspiring leader (took coffin on expeditions - morale)
- Battle
- Royalist cavalry swept away Parliamentary cavalry
- Parliamentary infantry beat Royalist infantry
- Only saved by reappearance of Royalist cavalry
- Essex withdrew
- Route to London left open
- After
- Swift advance on London might have meant Royalist victory
- King (perhaps shaken by first battle witnessed) = hesitant
- Took Oxford before advancing on London
- King (perhaps shaken by first battle witnessed) = hesitant
- November 1642: Essex + army move to London in front of King
- Londoners turned out in 1000s
- Women built trenches
- By the time Rupert = burning Brentford (learnt in 30 years war), Essex had 24,000 ready to defend City at Turnham Green (outskirts)
- Londoners turned out in 1000s
- Charles ignored Rupert's advice to force defences + withdrew to Oxford
- Ensured war would go on
- Best chance of quick victory
- Raw citizen soldiers might have panicked + fled
- Royalists might have been overwhelmed in bitter hand-to-hand street fighting by Londoners (eager to defend property against plundering)
- Therefore - in long run - lost whole war
- Swift advance on London might have meant Royalist victory
- Charles advances on London
- 1643
- Armies
- Royalist
- Duke of Newcastle: Northern army
- Clarendon (disliked): 'as fit to be a General as a Bishop'
- Sir Ralph Hopton in west
- Supported by cavalry of Sir George Goring
- Main field army centred around Oxford
- Rupert commanding cavalry
- Duke of Newcastle: Northern army
- Parliament
- Main field army under Essex
- Eastern Association (Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridge, Huntingdon, Lincolnshire) under Earl of Manchester
- Western army under Sir William Waller
- Fairfaxes (father + son) in Yorkshire
- Fought vs. Newcastle for clothing-town strongholds of Leeds + Bradford - lost
- Royalist
- Newcastle's failure
- Advanced into Lincolnshire threatening Eastern Association heartland
- Near Stamford (extreme south Lincolnshire), decided to retreat + besiege Hull with main forces
- Result of sharp checks he + forces received from Cromwell's newly trained cavalry
- Cromwell rose to prominence as a cavalry commander in Eastern association
- Promoted soldiers purely on merit + insisted on iron discipline
- Cromwell rose to prominence as a cavalry commander in Eastern association
- Also suffered supply lines becoming stretched + fear of attack on rear by Hull garrison
- Result of sharp checks he + forces received from Cromwell's newly trained cavalry
- Near Stamford (extreme south Lincolnshire), decided to retreat + besiege Hull with main forces
- War in East returned to series of cavalry raids + skirmishes rather than determined + dangerous Royalist advance
- Advanced into Lincolnshire threatening Eastern Association heartland
- Hopton's failure
- Hopton's attack in South (Hampshire + Sussex) = most successful
- Supply lines eventually halted him
- Troops reluctant to march too far from home counties
- Siege of Gloucester + Battle of Newbury (1643)
- Strategy had broken down - decided to besiege Gloucester (held out for Parliament in Royalist West)
- Had important position across Charles' supply lines
- Fall would have catastrophic effect on Parliamentary morale
- Already shaken - king's strategy = breaking down but Parliament hadn't had any decisive victories + initiative still seemed to be with king
- Essex relieved Gloucester + found King barring path at Newbury on return to London on 20 September 1643
- Battle = draw
- Strategic victory for Essex (forces able to continue march to Lodnon
- Strategy had broken down - decided to besiege Gloucester (held out for Parliament in Royalist West)
- Armies
- Scottish and Irish (Autumn 1643)
- Scots - Solemn League + Covenant (September)
- Scottish forces coming south would trap Newcastle's forces between them + Eastern Association
- 1633 = indecisive fighting
- Both sides tried to swing balance through outside help
- Irish - Cessation
- King negotiated ceasefire with Irish rebels
- Able to bring back English regiments from Ireland
- No advantage - troops captured by Brereton + changed sides
- Able to bring back English regiments from Ireland
- King negotiated ceasefire with Irish rebels
- Scots - Solemn League + Covenant (September)
- Battle of Marston Moor (July 1644)
- Parliament (with Cromwell's cavalry in lead) attacked
- King's Northern Army destroyed
- Eastern Association cavalry showed to be a match for Royalist
- Newcastle's regiment (Whitecoats) died to a man
- Newcastle fled to continent
- Rupert escaped with c.6,000 men
- Rupert's mistakes
- Offered battle at Marston Moor on 2 July
- Should have gathered own + Newcastle's forces and retreated (as Newcastle advised)
- Inferior force - c. 9,000 less
- May have believed orders from king = offer battle
- Dynamic, ruthless attitude to war = wanted to offer battle if possibly could
- Should have gathered own + Newcastle's forces and retreated (as Newcastle advised)
- Believed (as evening was drawing on) there would be no battle
- Offered battle at Marston Moor on 2 July
- King had lost north - York surrendered within fortnight
- Could easily have been final blow for Royalists - opportunity not taken
- Scots went to besiege port of Newcastle
- Fairfax engaged in 'mopping up' operations vs. individual strongholds
- Earl of Manchester returned to East
- Parliament (with Cromwell's cavalry in lead) attacked
- Problems for both sides
- Localism
- Throughout first 2 years
- Reluctance of troops raised in one area to move far from home
- London Trained Bands = anxious to return after relief of Gloucester
- Hopton's Cornish Trained Bands = no wish to campaign in Hampshire
- Money raised locally often spent locally, rather than on armies
- Prob. less than 10% of monies raised by Parliamentary county committees ever left county
- Even Eastern Association (most successful organisation in uniting county efforts) not immune
- Disagreement + command structure
- Parliament
- United, in theory, after 1643
- Under command of Committee of Two Kingdoms
- In practice - commanders would ignore their urgings
- Essex + Manchester made own decisions
- United, in theory, after 1643
- Royalist
- In theory, should have been more coordinated (Charles as Commander-in-Chief)
- Mirrored court before 1642
- Factions + rivalries undermined common cause
- Digby tried to turn Charles against field commanders (esp. Rupert)
- Some officers (e.g. Goring) didn't always obey orders
- Factions + rivalries undermined common cause
- Individuals tended to act alone
- Neither side (at this stage) had coordinated grand strategy being carried out by a national military machine
- One reason why First Civil War = so long
- Parliament
- Localism
- Royalist recovery
- Essex + Waller
- Meant to advance on Oxford together
- Rivalries = couldn't cooperate for long
- Essex decided to attack Royalist strongholds in west (Lyme Regis still holding out for Parliament)
- Charles defeated Waller at Cropredy Bridge (6 June)
- Waller's army disintegrated
- King pursued Essex in West
- Essex decided to attack Royalist strongholds in west (Lyme Regis still holding out for Parliament)
- Earl of Manchester's failure (October)
- Manchester failed to chase Royalists after their retreat after second Battle of Newbury
- Essex + Waller
- New Model Army creation (winter 1644)
- Cavalry
- At first = most reliable element
- Whole army gradually gained discipline + coherence
- Largely drawn from old Eastern Association - Cromwell's 'Ironsides'
- At first = most reliable element
- Commanders
- Philip Skippon (professional soldier in 30 years war) commanding infantry
- Overshadowed by Fairfax + Cromwell
- Philip Skippon (professional soldier in 30 years war) commanding infantry
- Religious independency
- Hostile to Anglicanism + Presbyterianism
- Spread rapidly (esp. in cavalry)
- Majority of officers = Independents
- Promotion by merit
- Revolutionary
- Led to rise of officers from humble backgrounds
- Caused Royalists (Hyde) + social conservatives (Holles) much concern
- Majority of senior officers were, and remained, from gentry families (Cromwell, Skippon, Lambert, Fleetwood)
- Although some prominent colonels were tradesmen
- Majority of senior officers were, and remained, from gentry families (Cromwell, Skippon, Lambert, Fleetwood)
- Caused Royalists (Hyde) + social conservatives (Holles) much concern
- After failures, Cromwell accused Manchester of not wanting to win + raised fear in Parliament that war = forever unless new measures + commanders put in place
- Polite removal of Essex + Manchester
- Creation of New Model Army
- Paid for by Parliament (not local organisations)
- Cavalry
- Battle of Naseby (June 1645)
- Rupert failed to see 'big picture'
- Royalists = completely destroyed
- King lost last field army capable of fighting a major pitched battle
- After
- New Model Army fought series of 'mopping up' operations (e.g. Goring's Langport force) + drawn-out sieges of Royalist strongholds
- March 1646: Sir Jacob Astley (courageous commander of remaining Royalist infantry) surrendered at Stow-on-the-Wold
- King surrendered to Scots in May 1646
- Last Royalist stronghold (Oxford) surrendered in June 1646
- Conclusion - why Parliament won
- Greater financial resources (East, South + London)
- Better organisation of financial resources - Pym
- Possession of London + East Anglia (trade + wealth)
- Better organisation of financial resources - Pym
- Possession of London + East Anglia (trade + wealth)
- King's strategic failures 1642-3 (still had some real chance of victory)
- Control of sea - prevented arms/troops from abroad reaching King
- Solemn League + Covenant = Scottish help in north
- Eventual creation on central command structure + New Model Army
- Greater financial resources (East, South + London)
- Strengths + Weaknesses
- Monthly assessment
- Charles ignored Rupert's advice to force defences + withdrew to Oxford
- Ensured war would go on
- Best chance of quick victory
- Raw citizen soldiers might have panicked + fled
- Royalists might have been overwhelmed in bitter hand-to-hand street fighting by Londoners (eager to defend property against plundering)
- Therefore - in long run - lost whole war
- Irish - Cessation
- King negotiated ceasefire with Irish rebels
- Able to bring back English regiments from Ireland
- No advantage - troops captured by Brereton + changed sides
- Able to bring back English regiments from Ireland
- King negotiated ceasefire with Irish rebels
- Voluntarily rejoined army Essex had formed once in Parliamentary territory
- Infantry (though disarmed) = so badly treated by Royalists
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